Suchergebnisse

Economic calculation applied to the choice of road investments, developed by the economists engineers of roads and bridges, is a tool to enlighten the choices of policymakers. But the effectiveness of this tool does not result in the choices, policy makers referring to a wider rationality that involved the desirability and political feasibility. Also, the economic calculations remain despite attempts by experts to correct its incompleteness, insufficiently embedded in the decision process. However, recognition of economic expertise as an "exclusive" attribute of the Ponts et Chaussées (highways department), as well as technical expertise, will allow it in the mid-1960s to be given "ownership" of the highway case. With this dual recognition, it can design its own solutions, have them validated and implemented. Simple tool for rationalizing choices, economic calculation becomes an instrument of power to serve the ambitions of this department. But in the late 1980s, the economic maturity of the highway network being reached, the Ministry of Finance, based on the expertise of the direction of the Forecast, will interfere in the selection motorway making use of a strategy that will join the Court of Auditors and the General Planning Commission, following a subtle "instrumentation" window, to "destabilize" the direction of the Equipment Department of Roads from the shortcomings of its methods. In the context unfavorable to highway investments of the 1990s, economic calculation will become a tool for streamlining the decision process, the direction of the Routes to adapt to its environment to going on rolling out the "ribbon" highway.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic calculation. It is also more widely sociology of administration through the power relations between departments and thought on the introduction of economics as a science of government.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic ...

Economic calculation applied to the choice of road investments, developed by the economists engineers of roads and bridges, is a tool to enlighten the choices of policymakers. But the effectiveness of this tool does not result in the choices, policy makers referring to a wider rationality that involved the desirability and political feasibility. Also, the economic calculations remain despite attempts by experts to correct its incompleteness, insufficiently embedded in the decision process. However, recognition of economic expertise as an "exclusive" attribute of the Ponts et Chaussées (highways department), as well as technical expertise, will allow it in the mid-1960s to be given "ownership" of the highway case. With this dual recognition, it can design its own solutions, have them validated and implemented. Simple tool for rationalizing choices, economic calculation becomes an instrument of power to serve the ambitions of this department. But in the late 1980s, the economic maturity of the highway network being reached, the Ministry of Finance, based on the expertise of the direction of the Forecast, will interfere in the selection motorway making use of a strategy that will join the Court of Auditors and the General Planning Commission, following a subtle "instrumentation" window, to "destabilize" the direction of the Equipment Department of Roads from the shortcomings of its methods. In the context unfavorable to highway investments of the 1990s, economic calculation will become a tool for streamlining the decision process, the direction of the Routes to adapt to its environment to going on rolling out the "ribbon" highway.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic calculation. It is also more widely sociology of administration through the power relations between departments and thought on the introduction of economics as a science of government.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic ...

Economic calculation applied to the choice of road investments, developed by the economists engineers of roads and bridges, is a tool to enlighten the choices of policymakers. But the effectiveness of this tool does not result in the choices, policy makers referring to a wider rationality that involved the desirability and political feasibility. Also, the economic calculations remain despite attempts by experts to correct its incompleteness, insufficiently embedded in the decision process. However, recognition of economic expertise as an "exclusive" attribute of the Ponts et Chaussées (highways department), as well as technical expertise, will allow it in the mid-1960s to be given "ownership" of the highway case. With this dual recognition, it can design its own solutions, have them validated and implemented. Simple tool for rationalizing choices, economic calculation becomes an instrument of power to serve the ambitions of this department. But in the late 1980s, the economic maturity of the highway network being reached, the Ministry of Finance, based on the expertise of the direction of the Forecast, will interfere in the selection motorway making use of a strategy that will join the Court of Auditors and the General Planning Commission, following a subtle "instrumentation" window, to "destabilize" the direction of the Equipment Department of Roads from the shortcomings of its methods. In the context unfavorable to highway investments of the 1990s, economic calculation will become a tool for streamlining the decision process, the direction of the Routes to adapt to its environment to going on rolling out the "ribbon" highway.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic calculation. It is also more widely sociology of administration through the power relations between departments and thought on the introduction of economics as a science of government.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic calculation. It is also more widely sociology of administration through the power relations between departments and througt on the introduction of economics as a science of government. ; Le calcul économique appliqué aux choix des investissements routiers, mis au point par les ingénieurs-économistes du corps des ponts et chaussées, est un outil destiné à éclairer les choix des décideurs. Or, l'efficacité de cet outil ne se traduit pas ipso facto dans les choix, les décideurs se référant à une rationalité plus large où interviennent l'opportunité et la faisabilité politiques. Aussi, le calcul économique demeurera, malgré les tentatives des experts pour remédier à son incomplétude, insuffisamment inséré au sein du processus de décision. Cependant, la reconnaissance de l'expertise économique comme un attribut « exclusif » du corps des ponts et chaussées, au même titre que son expertise technique, va lui permettre dès le milieu des années 1960 de se voir confier la « propriété » du problème autoroutier. Fort de cette double reconnaissance, il pourra concevoir ses propres solutions, les faire valider et les mettre en œuvre. De simple outil de rationalisation des choix, le calcul économique deviendra un instrument de pouvoir au « service » des ambitions de ce corps. Mais à la fin des années 1980, la maturité économique du réseau autoroutier étant atteinte, le ministère des Finances, s'appuyant sur l'expertise de la direction de la Prévision, s'ingèrera dans les choix autoroutiers en usant d'une stratégie à laquelle se rallieront la Cour des comptes et le Commissariat Général du Plan, suite à une subtile « instrumentalisation » croisée visant à « déstabiliser » la direction des Routes du ministère de l'Equipement à partir des insuffisances de ses méthodes d'évaluation. Dans le contexte défavorable aux investissements autoroutiers des années 1990, le calcul économique se transformera en un outil de rationalisation du processus de décision, la direction des Routes devant s'adapter à son environnement pour continuer à dérouler le « ruban » autoroutier. Cette thèse propose un éclairage nouveau sur le rôle joué par le ministère des Finances, celui de « promoteur » du calcul économique. Elle est aussi plus largement une sociologie de l'administration à travers les rapports de force entre corps et une réflexion sur l'introduction de l'économie comme science de gouvernement.Cette thèse propose un éclairage nouveau sur le rôle joué par le ministère des Finances, celui de « promoteur » du calcul économique. Elle est aussi plus largement une sociologie de l'administration à travers les rapports de force entre corps et une réflexion sur l'introduction de l'économie comme science de gouvernement.

Economic calculation applied to the choice of road investments, developed by the economists engineers of roads and bridges, is a tool to enlighten the choices of policymakers. But the effectiveness of this tool does not result in the choices, policy makers referring to a wider rationality that involved the desirability and political feasibility. Also, the economic calculations remain despite attempts by experts to correct its incompleteness, insufficiently embedded in the decision process. However, recognition of economic expertise as an "exclusive" attribute of the Ponts et Chaussées (highways department), as well as technical expertise, will allow it in the mid-1960s to be given "ownership" of the highway case. With this dual recognition, it can design its own solutions, have them validated and implemented. Simple tool for rationalizing choices, economic calculation becomes an instrument of power to serve the ambitions of this department. But in the late 1980s, the economic maturity of the highway network being reached, the Ministry of Finance, based on the expertise of the direction of the Forecast, will interfere in the selection motorway making use of a strategy that will join the Court of Auditors and the General Planning Commission, following a subtle "instrumentation" window, to "destabilize" the direction of the Equipment Department of Roads from the shortcomings of its methods. In the context unfavorable to highway investments of the 1990s, economic calculation will become a tool for streamlining the decision process, the direction of the Routes to adapt to its environment to going on rolling out the "ribbon" highway.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic calculation. It is also more widely sociology of administration through the power relations between departments and thought on the introduction of economics as a science of government.This thesis offers a new light on the role played by the Ministry of Finance, the "sponsor" of economic calculation. It is also more widely sociology of administration through the power relations between departments and througt on the introduction of economics as a science of government. ; Le calcul économique appliqué aux choix des investissements routiers, mis au point par les ingénieurs-économistes du corps des ponts et chaussées, est un outil destiné à éclairer les choix des décideurs. Or, l'efficacité de cet outil ne se traduit pas ipso facto dans les choix, les décideurs se référant à une rationalité plus large où interviennent l'opportunité et la faisabilité politiques. Aussi, le calcul économique demeurera, malgré les tentatives des experts pour remédier à son incomplétude, insuffisamment inséré au sein du processus de décision. Cependant, la reconnaissance de l'expertise économique comme un attribut « exclusif » du corps des ponts et chaussées, au même titre que son expertise technique, va lui permettre dès le milieu des années 1960 de se voir confier la « propriété » du problème autoroutier. Fort de cette double reconnaissance, il pourra concevoir ses propres solutions, les faire valider et les mettre en œuvre. De simple outil de rationalisation des choix, le calcul économique deviendra un instrument de pouvoir au « service » des ambitions de ce corps. Mais à la fin des années 1980, la maturité économique du réseau autoroutier étant atteinte, le ministère des Finances, s'appuyant sur l'expertise de la direction de la Prévision, s'ingèrera dans les choix autoroutiers en usant d'une stratégie à laquelle se rallieront la Cour des comptes et le Commissariat Général du Plan, suite à une subtile « instrumentalisation » croisée visant à « déstabiliser » la direction des Routes du ministère de l'Equipement à partir des insuffisances de ses méthodes d'évaluation. Dans le contexte défavorable aux investissements autoroutiers des années 1990, le calcul économique se transformera en un outil de rationalisation du processus de décision, la direction des Routes devant s'adapter à son environnement pour continuer à dérouler le « ruban » autoroutier. Cette thèse propose un éclairage nouveau sur le rôle joué par le ministère des Finances, celui de « promoteur » du calcul économique. Elle est aussi plus largement une sociologie de l'administration à travers les rapports de force entre corps et une réflexion sur l'introduction de l'économie comme science de gouvernement.Cette thèse propose un éclairage nouveau sur le rôle joué par le ministère des Finances, celui de « promoteur » du calcul économique. Elle est aussi plus largement une sociologie de l'administration à travers les rapports de force entre corps et une réflexion sur l'introduction de l'économie comme science de gouvernement.